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Studies

ANCIENT HISTORY

PERICLES, CLEON AND THE ANDRAGATHIZOMENOI

Abstract: In 430 B.C. Pericles appealed to the Athenians with his last speech that is remarkable for its mention of those Athenians who “in the alarm of the moment have become enamored of the honesty of such an unambitious part (ἀπραγμοσύνη ἀνδραγαθίζεσθαι)” or “playing the *agathos* by remaining inactive”- in the alternative translation. I should label them as the *andragithozomenoi*. Cleon’s speech in the Mytilenean debate displays many ideas in common with Pericles’ last speech. He reproaches those who ‘cultivate honesty without danger (ἐκ τοῦ ἀκινδύνου ἀνδραγαθίζεσθαι)’. One can easily find here a close stylistic similarity with Pericles’ words. Both speakers label Athens’ power over the allies as a tyranny. They both mention *andragathizomenoi* and made them responsible for giving up the empire. Were these textual similarities accidental or intentional? and who were the *andragathizomenoi*?

Keywords: *Thucydides, Peloponnesian War, Pericles, Cleon, apragmones, andragathia.*

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In 430 B.C. Pericles appealed to the Athenians with his last speech.¹ He came forward in an unfavorable situation. Many Athenians, being discouraged over the beginning of the war, were dissatisfied with their leader.² They wanted to make peace with the Peloponnesians, but their initiative was unsuccessful. In his last speech, Pericles persuaded the Athenians to continue the war in spite of the difficulties they were faced with. The war, he argued, was inevitable. The Athenians had no choice: whether to submit to the Spartans or to fight for their independence. That independence relied not only on the Athenians’ will but on them retaining their power over the allies:

Again, your country has a right to your services in sustaining the glories of her position. These are a common source of pride to you all, and you cannot decline the burdens of empire and still expect to share its honors. You should remember also that what you are fighting against is not merely slavery as an exchange for independence, but also loss of empire and danger from the animosities incurred in its exercise. Besides, to recede is no longer possible, if indeed any of you in the alarm of the moment has become enamored of the honesty of such an unambitious part (εἴ τις καὶ τότε ἐν τῷ παρόντι δεδιῶς ἀπραγμοσύνη ἀνδραγαθίζεσθαι).³

¹ For commentary see RHODES 1988, 236-46; RUSTEN 1989, 297-307; HORNBLOWER 1991, 331-340. For a discussion on the time of the writing see GOMME 1945, 167; ANDREWES 1960, 1-10; *contra* KAGAN 1974, 365-7.

² Pericles himself speaks about great and sudden changes of fortune (Thuc. II.61.2-3), the plague was beyond any forecast (Thuc. II.64.1). However, that change (and fickleness of the people when faced with it) was foreseen in Pericles’ first speech (Thuc. I.140.1).

³ “Play the *agathos* by remaining inactive” (ADKINS 1972, 134) and “the timid or inactive among you feel like playing at being noble” in Hornblower’s translation (HORNBLOWER 1991, 337).

Then follows his famous utterance:

For what you hold is, to speak somewhat plainly, a tyranny; to take it perhaps was wrong, but to let it go is unsafe. And men of these retiring views, making converts of others, would quickly ruin a state; indeed the result would be the same if they could live independent by themselves; for the retiring and unambitious are never secure without vigorous protectors at their side (τὸ γὰρ ἀπραγμον οὐ σώζεται μὴ μετὰ τοῦ δραστηρίου τεταγμένον); in fine, such qualities are useless to an imperial city, though they may help a dependency to an unmolested servitude (Thuc. II.63.1-3, tr. Dutton).⁴

Further Pericles says that anyone who wishes to do something will emulate the Athenians, while the *apragmon* would consider them blameworthy: These glories may incur the censure of the slow and unambitious (ταῦτα ὁ μὲν ἀπράγμων μέμψαιτ' ἄν); but in the breast of energy they will awake emulation, and in those who must remain without them an envious regret (Thuc. II.64.4).⁵

Pericles' speech is remarkable for its repeated mention of the *apragmones* and *apragmosyne*.⁶ Some scholars regard *apragmosyne* as an opposition to imperialistic policy: thus, the *apragmones* were anti-imperialists and Pericles' adversaries as well.⁷ *Polypragmosyne*, or an active imperialistic policy, was in this case obviously opposed to *apragmosyne*.⁸

Thus they (the Athenians) toil on in trouble and danger all the days of their life, with little opportunity for enjoying, being ever engaged in getting: their only idea of a holiday is to do what the occasion demands, and to them laborious occupation is less of a misfortune than the peace of a quiet life (ἡσυχίαν ἀπράγμονα) (Thuc. I.70.8).⁹

However, in his last speech Pericles made us understand that *apragmosyne* was caused by the alarm of the moment (ἐν τῷ παρόντι δεδιώς) rather than principle.¹⁰ So it was because of the current desperate events rather than opposition that the *apragmones* did not take into account Athens' imperial interests.

⁴ I should accept the interpretation of II.63.3 by Hornblower, who finds here a military metaphor: the *apragmon* may survive only when "marshalled with the *drasterios*" (HORNBLOWER 1991, 338).

⁵ Pericles has in mind here, I assume, the state (i.e. imperial) policy; cf. I.32.5, where the Corcyrean ambassadors describe their state's policy as *apragmosyne*. See also GOMME 1945, 166-7; HORNBLOWER 1991, 77-8; KLEVE 1964, 85; ALLISON 1979, 13,14; CARTER 1986, 39-40.

⁶ It is often equated with quietism (*hesychia*) and wisdom (*sophrosyne*). Gomme and Rusten consider ἀπράγμων to be a complimentary term (GOMME 1945, 167 f.; RUSTEN 1989, 155; contra EHRENBERG 1947, 48 n. 9; CREED 1973, 228). See also GOMME 1956, 122; CONNOR 1992, 175 f.; contra HUART 1968, 171; ALLISON 1979, 10; on *apragmosyne* in comedy see EHRENBERG 1947, 54 f.; BUIS 2019. The withdrawal of the *apragmon* from politics is regarded as an aristocratic style of life (e.g. DONLAN 1980, 122; CARTER 1986, 27). Adkins stated, on the contrary, that 'quietism' and inactivity are sharply opposed to the concept of *arête* (ADKINS 1972, 134).

⁷ NESTLE 1926; cf. DIENELT 1953; EHRENBERG 1947, 47; ROMILLY 1963, 78, 123; KLEVE 1964, 83-8; CARTER 1986, 27, 38.

⁸ EHRENBERG 1947; Kleve 1964. For Harding all Athenians were *polypragmones* (HARDING 1981), but Allison doubts if there is an elaborate concept *apragmosyne*-*polypragmosyne* in Thucydides' work (ALLISON 1979, 13, 14). According to Gomme, Pericles had in mind not any specific group but those who were in nervous state in that moment (GOMME 1956, 167; see also HUART 1968, 371, n. 4).

⁹ EHRENBERG 1947, 48, n. 9; cf. GOMME 1945, 167 f.

¹⁰ Certainly, Pericles may have deliberately misinterpreted his opponents' attitude. But I am inclined to trust in these words.

The *apragmon* was mentioned in Pericles' funeral oration. "...Unlike any other nation, he says, regarding him who takes no part in these (public – V.G.) duties not as unambitious but as useless (οὐκ ἀπράγμονα ἀλλ' ἀχρεῖον νομίζομεν)" (Thuc. II. 40.2). An *apragmon* here is anyone who has opted out of public affairs, or avoids public trouble for whatever reason.¹¹ I should label him as an individualist or egoist who places the state's interest below his own. This use of the word differs slightly from that of Pericles' last speech.¹² In that context it meant those who intended to give up the Empire, and in this context one who withdrew or abstained from political life.¹³

Regardless of the meaning of *apragmosyne*, that problem must be investigated in a different way. In his last speech Pericles speaks not about the *apragmon* but about anyone who in the current situation by preference ἀπραγμοσύνη ἀνδραγαθίζεται, or, to put it the other way round, *apragmosyne andragathizomenoi*. The verb ἀνδραγαθίζεται is translated in LSJ as "behave in a manly, upright manner".¹⁴ So *andragathizomenoi* enjoyed the high quality of *andragathia*, or "bravery, manly virtue...the character of an upright man".¹⁵

Andragathia is mentioned in Thucydides' work several times (II.42.3; III.57.111, 64.4; V.101.1). In III.57.1 it is specifically a virtue of the Spartans.¹⁶ In another passage the Thebans denounce the false *andragathia* of the Plataeans (III.64.4).¹⁷ In Book V the Athenians explain to the Melians their "contest not being an equal one, with honor as the prize and shame as the penalty (οὐ γὰρ περὶ ἀνδραγαθίας ὁ ἀγὼν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου ὑμῖν), but a question of self-preservation and of not resisting those who are far stronger than you are" (V.101.1).¹⁸

Andragathia denotes here the quality of a noble (or a hoplite). Anyone may display it in battle for the sake of his country. Therefore, Pericles says in his funeral oration:

For there is justice in the claim that steadfastness in his country's battles should be as a cloak to cover a man's other imperfections (δίκαιον τὴν ἐς τοὺς πολέμους ὑπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος ἀνδραγαθίαν προτιθεσθαι); since the good action has blotted out the bad, and his merit as a citizen more than outweighed his demerits as an individual (Thuc. II.42.3).

His *arête* is contrasted in the speech with the cowardice of those who preferred to enjoy their wealth instead of demonstrating *andragathia* (Thuc. II. 42.4). Here

¹¹ Rhodes translates *apragmosyne* as 'avoidance of trouble' (RHODES 1988, 112, 114 with commentary: 239, 240).

¹² Carter points out that the clue lies in the word *achreios* (CARTER 1986, 27). He thinks the *apragmon* of funeral oration was Pericles' adversary rather than a 'quietist' (CARTER 1986, 39).

¹³ CARTER 1986, 39. The *apragmon* of funeral oration, he argues, was Pericles' adversary rather than a 'quietist' (*ibid*).

¹⁴ LSJ, 127. Dover supposes that the abstract noun ἀνδραγαθία and the verb ἀνδραγαθίζεται do not refer to physical courage but to the possession of qualities which attract respect and admiration (DOVER 1974, 165).

¹⁵ LSJ, 127.

¹⁶ "A merit for which Dorians especially valued themselves ... the special Dorian claim to an aristocratic strain of feeling and conduct" (MARCHANT 1909, 172 [quoting R.A. Neill]).

¹⁷ See e.g. HUART 1968, 464.

¹⁸ For commentary on this see GOMME *et alii* 1970, 170. Adkins referred *andragathia* to the traditional standard of *arête* (ADKINS 1976, 113).

Pericles obviously regards *andragathia* as (or reduces it to) the soldiers' manliness and bravery.¹⁹

In II.63.2 we find Pericles reproaching *andragathizomenoi*, or those who wish to demonstrate their manliness and bravery. What is more, he links it with *apragmosyne*. Here perhaps we may detect irony on Pericles' part. In LSJ *ἀπραγμοσύνη ἀνδραγαθίζεται* is translated as "if anyone thinks to sit at home and play the honest man".²⁰ If "men of these retiring views, Pericles insists, making converts of others, would quickly ruin a state; indeed the result would be the same if they could live independent by themselves" (Thuc. II.63.3). Why should non-involvement by these people, Hornblower wonders, be so ruinous?²¹ He mentions the comedy of Aristophanes, where the two Athenians are looking for *topos apragmon* (trouble-free place) (Ar. Birds 44, cf. Wasps 1040).²² So, the particular 'trouble' which they are escaping is Athenian litigation.²³ But this does not explain what Pericles said. A similar idea (and possible explanation) one may find in Alcibiades' speech, who says "that a city not inactive by nature could not choose a quicker way to ruin itself than by suddenly adopting such a policy (*πόλιν μὴ ἀπράγμοια τάχιστ' ἂν μοι δοκεῖν ἀπραγμοσύνης μεταβολῆ διαφθαρήναι*)" (Thuc. VI.18.7).²⁴

There is another passage in Thucydides' work, where *andragathizomenoi* are mentioned. Cleon's speech in the Mytilenean debate, in which he displays many ideas in common with and direct textual echoes of Pericles' last speech.²⁵

After Athenians had put down the revolt of Mytilene they passed a decree according to which all males were to be executed, and the women and children were to be sold into slavery. Thucydides says that the decree owed much to the demagogue Cleon and the Athenians' anger against the Mytileneans.²⁶ It was Cleon's motion that won that day (Thuc. III.36.5). The next day the Athenians convened a new meeting of the assembly, regretting their preceding decision.²⁷ This time they changed their minds against Cleon's opinion.

There were several speakers in that meeting, as Thucydides says, but he informs his readers about two only (e.g. Thuc. III.36.6, 49.1).²⁸ One of them was Cleon who begins his speech this way: "I have often before now been convinced that a democracy is incapable of empire..." (Thuc.

¹⁹ The Athenians were credited with *andragathia* in spite of their personal qualities. Carter finds Pericles departing here from tradition (CARTER 1986, 26 f.).

²⁰ LSJ, 127; cf. GOMME *et alii* 1970, 170; ADKINS 1976, 13; POUNCEY 1980, 100-1; RUSTEN 1989, 20.

²¹ HORNBLOWER 1991, 338.

²² See also EHRENBERG 1947, 55.

²³ HORNBLOWER 1991, 338, see also DOVER 1974, 188 f.

²⁴ See also EHRENBERG 1947, 50.

²⁵ For lists of the echoes of Pericles in Cleon's speech see GOMME 1956, 311; CONNOR 1984, 79, n. 1.

²⁶ In his speech Cleon states that the Mytileneans were autonomous and received honour from the Athenians (Thuc. III.39.2). On the *autonomia* of Mytilene see OSTWALD 1982, 31-4, 43.

²⁷ Woodhead found a discrepancy between the motives of the new discussion and what was said by the orators (WOODHEAD 1970, 160, 210, n. 17).

²⁸ For commentary see RHODES 1994, 204; HORNBLOWER 1991, 420 f.

III.37.1).²⁹ Then he says (just as Pericles had said before him) that Athens' power over the allies is nothing other than a tyranny (Thuc. III.37.2).³⁰ That is why Athens' allies hate the Athenians and are constantly plotting against them. At the end of the speech he says the following:

"To sum up shortly, I say that if you follow my advice you will do what is just towards the Mityleneans, and at the same time expedient; while by a different decision you will not oblige them so much as pass sentence upon yourselves. For if they were right in rebelling, you must be wrong in ruling. However, if, right or wrong, you determine to rule, you must carry out your principle and punish the Mityleneans as your interest requires; or else you must give up your empire and cultivate honesty without danger (*ἢ παύεσθαι τῆς ἀρχῆς καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἀκινδύνου ἀνδραγαθίζεσθαι*)" (Thuc. III. 40. 4).

Then there came forward Diodotus son of Eucrates, who represented, as Cleon makes us understand, the attitude of the *andragathizomenoi*. He argued against the brutal punishment of the Mytileneans because it would not be useful for the Athenians. The *demos* and the democratic parties of the allied cities, he argued, were potential Athenians' supporters, they might prevent revolt in the future or make it less dangerous (Thuc. III.46.6-47.7). His motion won after all.³¹

One can easily find in Cleon a close stylistic similarity with Pericles' speech.³² Both speakers label Athens' power over the allies as a tyranny. They both mention *andragathizomenoi* and made them responsible for giving up the empire. Unlike Pericles, Cleon does not assign them the concept of *apragmosyne*. But his allegation *ἐκ τοῦ ἀκινδύνου ἀνδραγαθίζεσθαι* may well be equated with Pericles' phrase on anyone who *ἀπραγμοσύνη ἀνδραγαθίζεται*. Pericles' imperialism means hard work, Cleon's means danger.

The words of Cleon obviously echoed those used by Pericles (Thuc. II.63.2 and III.40.4). These textual similarities, I am sure, were not accidental.³³ Pericles and Cleon presented similar ideas. Even though Thucydides has a very different perspective on Pericles and Cleon, their attitudes towards the empire were the same.³⁴ The only part of Cleon's policy that was certainly un-Periclean, as Gomme maintains (but even so by implication rather than explicitly), was its cruelty and brutality.³⁵ Pericles in his last speech admits that the

²⁹ That criticism, as Rhodes argues, was more commonly made by oligarchs (RHODES 1994, 205). Lang goes too far in attributing to Cleon the authorship of Ps.-Xenophon's *Athenaion Politeia* (LANG 1972). Connor sees here only Cleon's exasperation (CONNOR 1984, 84). Winnington-Ingram suspects that Cleon's criticism and his subsequent reasoning about invalid laws may be addressed to a conservative audience (WINNINGTON-INGRAM 1965, 72).

³⁰ For Hornblower that is the most striking echo of Pericles' last speech (HORNBLOWER 1991, 422). See also note 27, below.

³¹ On Diodotus see OSTWALD 1979; DEVELIN 1989, 124; RHODES 1994, 210; HORNBLOWER 1991, 432. Diodotus' victory is regarded by Cogan as a transition from a "materialistic" to an "ideological" policy (COGAN 1981a, 61-2; *idem*, 1981b).

³² Gomme regarded III.40.4 as the most striking and famous echo of Pericles (GOMME 1956, 311).

³³ E.g. GOMME 1945, 311; contra ROMILLY 1963, 164-7.

³⁴ E.g. ADKINS 1972, 134 f.; see also CREED 1973.

³⁵ GOMME 1951, 78. Thucydides intends perhaps to point out the

acquisition of the empire seemed *adikon* and its possession is a tyranny, but insists that it would be dangerous to abandon it (Thuc. II.63.2; cf. III.37.2). The opposing view Pericles expressed through ἀπραγμοσύνη ἀνδραγαθίζεται is one of most outrageous oxymora possible in Greek, as Adkins maintains.³⁶ He correctly admits that Pericles is pouring scorn on the possibility of juster policies which involve *apragmosyne* because they do not conform to *andragathia*. *Dikaiosyne* is a quiet, co-operative virtue that Pericles terms as *apragmosyne*, i.e. inactivity.³⁷ Those who were refusing to accept Pericles' (and Cleon's) policy were attempting to redefine *andragathia* and to apply it to what Adkins would call the 'quiet, co-operative values' rather than (as usual) to the traditional *arête*, i.e. manliness and courage.³⁸

But who were the *andragothizomenoi*? Are Pericles and Cleon referring here to some group known to his audience, or are they talking in general, rebuking those who might be inclined to refuse their policy.

In both cases we may think of the speakers' opponents and 'peace party'.³⁹ As for Pericles they may be, as some scholars think, the followers of Thucydides son of Melesias: the latter must have returned from exile about 433 B.C. and must have made his presence felt at the beginning of the war.⁴⁰ But others consider Cleon as Pericles' main adversary⁴¹ Klein writes of a wide political spectrum including both the Athenian landed aristocracy and radical elements of the *demos*.⁴²

I am not inclined to look for the *andragathizomenoi* among certain persons. They may be those Athenians whose frame of mind (and attitude toward Pericles as well) depended heavily on current events. On the eve of Archidamus' first invasion the Athenians adopted Pericles' war strategy (though not immediately).⁴³ The evidence of this was the resettling in the city of the dwellers from the countryside (Thuc. II.14. 1-2, 16-18).⁴⁴ It is Pericles who persuaded them to take their families into the city. By this means he envisaged achieving superiority over Athens' more numerous enemies.⁴⁵ His plan implied withdrawal behind the walls of Athens and replacing the loss of agricultural products by imports (Thuc. I.143. 4-5).⁴⁶ Pericles envisaged

difference between them, the perseverance in one case (Pericles) and sheer obstinacy in the other (ROMILLY 1963, 165).

³⁶ ADKINS 1960, 235; ADKINS 1972, 134; cf. CREED 1973, 227-8.

³⁷ ADKINS 1960, 235; contra CREED 1973, 228.

³⁸ See also p. 3, n. 6, above.

³⁹ See p. 3, nn. 7, 8, above.

⁴⁰ WADE-GERY 1932, 219; KIENAST 1953, 210 f.; CARTER 1986, 40 f.

⁴¹ FROST 1964; ANDREWES 1978; HOLLADAY 1978, 423; KAGAN 1991, 187, 219.

⁴² KLEIN 1979, 514, 515.

⁴³ KAGAN 1991, 233. However, Pericles appealed to the Athenians twice (Thuc. I.143.5, II.13.2).

⁴⁴ This gives us the possibility, I believe, of assuming that his strategy was finally adopted. However, it is unclear, as Hornblower states, whether the resettling into the city was of the whole mass or not (HORNBLOWER 1985, 128; *idem* 1991, 238; RHODES 1988, 199).

⁴⁵ The Peloponnesians had an obvious superiority in number. Attica, as Thucydides writes, was invaded by two-thirds of the total forces of the Peloponnesian League (Thuc. II.10.2, 47.2). See also CAWKWELL 1975, 55, n. 6; SPENCE 1990, 102.

⁴⁶ SPENCE 1990, 91; on the negative aspect of this see CAWKWELL 1975, 54, n. 4. The arrangement made in the Piraeus before the Peloponnesian War, as Garland states, accepts (or rather acknowledges?) the possibility that Athens under siege might become wholly dependent on her imports (GARLAND 1987, 25, 27).

taking full advantage of the empire but in fact abandoned the territory of Attica to the Peloponnesians.⁴⁷

Archidamus' invasion of 431 B.C. disclosed the vulnerability of Pericles' war strategy, in particular, in the eyes of the Athenians. Unlike Pericles they were eager (especially the young men) to go up against the enemy.⁴⁸ Their ambitions were strengthened when Archidamus came near Acharnae (Thuc. II.20. 2-3).⁴⁹ There were many citizens in Athens (the Acharnians, for example) who urged Pericles to lead them out (Thuc. II.21.3): the hoplite mentality forced the Athenians to take counter-action against the Peloponnesians.⁵⁰ But that was not Pericles' aim.⁵¹

The Athenian strategy of avoiding battle led Archidamus to the devastation of the countryside (Thuc. II.20.2, 23.1). This greatly infuriated the Athenians, who were indignant with their indecisive leader. They remembered that Pericles had promised something much grander (Thuc. I.143.4).⁵² There was anger against Pericles in the city, as Thucydides writes: many Athenians cursed him: "Pericles was the object of general indignation; his previous counsels were totally forgotten; he was abused for not leading out the army which he commanded, and was made responsible for the whole of the public suffering (Περικλέα ἐν ὀργῇ εἶχον ... ἀλλ' ἐκάκιζον ὅτι στρατηγὸς ὦν οὐκ ἐπεξάγοι)" (Thuc. II.21.3, cf. Plut. Per. 33.6-7). They accused him of cowardice, or lack of *andragathia*.⁵³ They sang, Plutarch narrates, sarcastic songs slandering Pericles' method of waging war.⁵⁴ He cites Hermippos' verses where Pericles was labeled as the king of the satyrs, who were familiar as cowardly creatures:

Thou king of the Satyrs, why pray wilt thou not
Take the spear for thy weapon, and stop the dirce talk
With the which, until now, thou conductest the war.
While the soul of a Teles is in thee?
If the tiniest knife is but laid on the stone
To give it an edge, thou gnashest thy teeth,
As if bitten by fiery Cleon.'
(Hermippos, fr.47 KA = Plut. Per. 33.7-8).

The fierce Cleon was opposed to Pericles in these cursing verses. We may be sure that he was among Pericles' main critics this year.⁵⁵

In spite of this criticism Pericles held his position firmly. In that situation he refused to call an assembly or

⁴⁷ See WESTLAKE 1945, 75; KAGAN 1969, 334; contra SPENCE 1990, 92 f.

⁴⁸ The sources refer especially to the Athenian youth: "...on this particular occasion Peloponnesians and Athenians were both full of young men whose inexperience made them eager to take up arms" (Thuc. II.8.1; cf. Diod. Sic. XII.42.6)

⁴⁹ Archidamus wanted a battle with the Athenians here (Thuc. II.20.2; Plut. Per. 33.3). See also BRUNT 1967; BLOEDOW 1983.

⁵⁰ The aim of a hoplite army was traditionally to defend the arable land (see OSBORNE 1987, 137 f.; SPENCE 1990, 92).

⁵¹ This tactic, as Spence argues, was considered dishonourable for the Athenians because of the strong link between the hoplite and the concept of *agathos* (SPENCE 1990, 105)

⁵² SICKING 1995, 407.

⁵³ This referred in particular to the young men (see note 37, above). They would surely regard the avoidance of a pitched battle as cowardice. See Nicias' urging of the older men not to be ashamed of being accused of cowardice by the young supporters of Alcibiades (Thuc. VI.13.1). *Andragathia* may well be one of the slogans which was current among Pericles' critics.

⁵⁴ Thucydides writes of cavalry skirmishes (Thuc. II.19.2, 22.2, see also SPENCE 1990, 102). A few cavalry raids would hardly be sufficient to resist Archidamus.

⁵⁵ See p. 7 and note 30, above.

any kind of meeting. He was afraid that Athenians might take a wrong decision:

“He, meanwhile, seeing anger and infatuation just now in the ascendant, and confident of his wisdom in refusing a sally, would not call either assembly or meeting of the people (ἐκκλησίαν τε οὐκ ἐποίει αὐτῶν οὐδὲ ξύλλογον οὐδένα),⁵⁶ fearing the fatal results of a debate inspired by passion and not by prudence” (Thuc. II.22.1).⁵⁷

As an answer to his critics he organized seaborne raids against the Peloponnesians.⁵⁸ These raids seem to have proved quite effective and to have led to the dislodging of the Peloponnesians from Attica. Soon afterwards Pericles succeeded in quietening the Athenians’ irritation against him. However, not for long.

Archidamus’ second invasion changed the Athenians’ attitude towards Pericles again. Now the devastation of Attica took place on larger scale (on the devastation of the Plain see Thuc. II.47.3, of the Paralia and Laurium, II.55.1). The plague was added to the military disasters. It is then that dissatisfaction with Pericles reached its climax.⁵⁹ Discouraged by current events the Athenians sought to make peace with the Peloponnesians. They began to rebuke Pericles for unleashing this war. The *apragmones*, Westlake argued, were the main supporters of the bid for peace.⁶⁰ But Athenian envoys were sent only by the decision of the assembly. (Why did Pericles not prevent this meeting of the assembly?) It seems that the majority of the citizens who voted for that decision must have been *apragmones* or a ‘peace party’.⁶¹ However, in 430 B.C., I suspect, many ordinary Athenians wished to make peace with the Peloponnesians (e.g. the men like Aristophanes’ Dicaeopolis who painfully endured the loss of their houses and land). It was Pericles, they were sure, who was responsible for the beginning of this war and for their desperate current situation. However, the peace initiative was unsuccessful. That resulted in an increase in their anxiety and fear.

The harsh criticism of Pericles’ strategy did not weaken after the withdrawal of the enemy and return of the Athenian regular naval expedition from Peloponnesians. The Athenians were ready to change their leader. Many of them were frightened by the unsuccessful war and were depressed by their losses: some of these now regarded the empire as a heavy burden for the Athenian state. Others were Pericles’ political opponents (e.g. Cleon and his followers), who found in this situation a new pretext for disposing him from office.⁶²

⁵⁶ Hornblower translates it: ‘did not summon an assembly or military meeting’ (HORNBLOWER 1991, 275).

⁵⁷ He addressed himself, Thucydides continues, in the defense of the city (τὴν τε πόλιν ἐφύλασσε). Develin and Hamel suppose that Pericles was in charge of the defense of Attica (DEVELIN 1989, 102; HAMEL 1998, 91).

⁵⁸ A hundred ships were sent to the Peloponnesians (Thuc. II.23.2). This tactic seems to Cawkwell too expensive to be continued for a decade without extraordinary taxes (CAWKWELL 1975, 54). See also SICKING 1995, 406.

⁵⁹ CONNOR 1984, 64 (but in 57 n. 15 he states that the temptation to meet the Peloponnesians was not as strong as in the first year of the war); RUSTEN 1989, 196.

⁶⁰ WESTLAKE 1968, 36, n. 2.

⁶¹ On the sending of the envoys as a decision of the assembly see KAGAN 1991, 240-1. Only when they were persuaded by Pericles, as Thucydides wrote, the Athenians stopped sending embassies to Sparta (Thuc. II.65.2 with the commentary of RHODES 1988, 241).

⁶² Thucydides makes us understand that it was not long before the election

It is then that Pericles convened a meeting of the assembly and advocated his policy and war strategy. Making peace with the Peloponnesians, he argued, would relax Athens’ power over the allies. He declared that maintaining this power was their common concern. A sound (i.e. imperial) state would recover the citizens’ loss. Pericles labeled those who blamed him for a lack of *andragathia* as *apragmosyne andragathizomenoi* (not without satisfaction, I believe). They were those who were going, in the translation of LSJ, as sit at home and play the honest man.⁶³ Now Pericles reproached the Athenians for a lack of *andragathia*.⁶⁴

If what we have said is true, Adkins’ interpretation mentioned above is more questionable in his assumption that Pericles’ opponents were attempting to redefine *andragathia* and to apply it to the ‘quiet, co-operative values’.⁶⁵ One of the possible explanations would be that the very men who (in other circumstances) boasted their *andragathia* were now refusing to accept Pericles’ policy. Indeed, they were frightened by the course of the war, and may have been irritated with Pericles (whether or not he was right). That is why they may in fact have deposed Pericles from generalship, though Thucydides does not state that.⁶⁶ Nevertheless some time later they elected him as a general again, but not until they had inflicted a fine on him (Thuc. II.65.3-4). In this way *andragathizomenoi* punished Pericles for his war strategy.⁶⁷

Let us turn now to Cleon. He labels as *andragathizomenoi* those who vote against the brutal punishment of the Mytileneans. Some of them decided to vote this way because of their humanity. I am not inclined to reject Thucydides’ interpretation, as Woodhead did.⁶⁸ The others were Cleon’s political adversaries.⁶⁹

One may think of Cleon as Pericles’ trickster (e.g. as Thersites was that of Achilles).⁷⁰ Both speakers, I suspect, used this word in the same context. Pericles reproaches those who demonstrated a lack of *andragathia* because of the current situation. Cleon criticized those who were allegedly afraid of the danger of holding sway, who allegedly could demonstrate their *andragathia* ἐκ τοῦ ἀκινδύου only. Continuing to hold sway by means of brutality was for Cleon true audacity, or true *andragathia*. Those who were reluctant to display that sort of *andragathia* were for him cowards.

Pericles, if summarize the above, reproached the Athenians for their lack of courage (*andragathia*) towards the enemy, Cleon reproached them for the absence of courage for

of the *stratēgoi* (ὄσπερον δ’ αὐθις οὐ πολλῶ...στρατηγὸν εἶλοντο) (Thuc. II.65.4).

⁶³ See p. 5, above.

⁶⁴ Their independent state (a state of *apragmones* in Gomme’s words) would inevitably have shared the fate of Melos and Chios (GOMME 1945, 175, 176).

⁶⁵ See p. 8, above.

⁶⁶ Diodorus (12.45) and Plutarch (*Per.*35.4-5) write on Pericles’ being deposed from the generalship. “Probably, as Rhodes writes, he was deposed from office, either by special decree of the assembly or through the opportunity provided in each prytanny for depositions” (RHODES 1988, 241).

⁶⁷ Cleon may be among those who prosecuted Pericles (Plut. *Per.* 35.4; KLEIN 1979, 514, 533 n. 63). But he did not want, I believe, to make peace with the Peloponnesians: in this situation he planned to relax Pericles’ political position.

⁶⁸ See note 26, above.

⁶⁹ Kagan argues that they were Pericles’ followers (KAGAN 1975, 81).

⁷⁰ CAIRNS 1982, 203 f.

brutal punishment of their allies. Notwithstanding with it Cleon differed not so much from Pericles in the nature of his policy. The only part of Cleon's policy which was un-Periclean, as Gomme maintains, was its cruelty and brutality⁷¹. If so, the similarities in the speeches of both speakers hardly were accidental.

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⁷¹ GOMME 1951, 78.

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