TRACING THE ROOTS OF A STRATEGIC MISTAKE IN SASANIAN TRADE POLICY; A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE APPROACHES OF SHAPUR I AND BAHRAM I TOWARD PALMYRA

Abstract

Palmyra (Tadmor) in the third century CE was more than a commercial city-state; it was an economic ecosystem that commanded the network of caravan routes between the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean. The city's geographical position had made it a determining factor in the power equations between Iran and Rome—a factor that could both serve as a buffer to reduce border pressures and become a conduit for wealth flowing toward either power. This article, utilizing a historical-comparative method and case studies of two critical junctures, seeks to trace the roots of the Sasanians' failure to capitalize on this strategic opportunity. The research findings indicate that both Shapur I in his encounter with Odaenathus and Bahram I in confronting Zenobia shared a common error in assessing the region's geopolitics: an inability to grasp that Palmyra was not a dependent state, but an independent actor with a vital role in the interconnection of economy and politics. This error manifested as the pride of victory during Shapur's reign and as structural passivity during Bahram's reign, ultimately leading to the fall of Palmyra and the collapse of the region's trade network. The consequence of these two errors was not merely the loss of a potential ally, but the transformation of the western frontiers into a direct and costly line of confrontation with Rome.